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Attorney's Fees

[02/02] Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC
In a suit alleging that a roommate-matching service website’s questions requiring disclosure of sex, sexual orientation and familial status, and its sorting, steering and matching of users based on those characteristics, violate the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), the district court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs, permanent injunction, and order awarding attorney's fees is: 1) vacated in part where plaintiffs had organizational standing; and 2) dismissed in part where the FHA and FEHA do not apply to the sharing of living units because precluding individuals from selecting roommates based on their sex, sexual orientation and familial status raises substantial constitutional concerns, and therefore the defendant's prompting, sorting and publishing of information to facilitate roommate selection is not forbidden by the FHA or FEHA.

[02/02] Lore v. City of Syracuse
In a case alleging illegal retaliation against a city police officer under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (HRL) because of her complaints of gender discrimination, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part where the city's arguments regarding the availability of reputation damages, evidentiary and instructional errors, and excessive damages for emotional distress presented no basis for disturbing the judgment; and 2) vacated in part where there was merit in plaintiff's contentions regarding the liability of the city's corporation counsel, and the district court erred in dismissing her principal gender discrimination claims under the HRL on the basis that she had suffered no materially adverse employment action.

[02/02] Marriage of Wahl
On appeal from an order requiring an ex-wife to pay to her former husband $552,153.28 in attorney's fees and costs as a sanction because of her conduct with respect to two post-dissolution orders, the order is affirmed, where the record disclosed no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award, and additional sanctions are imposed against the appellant and her appellate attorneys on a finding that the appeal is frivolous.

[02/02] Lewow v. Surfside III Condominium Owners' Ass'n, Inc.
In a case in which judgment was entered in favor of a condominium association on a complaint for failure to perform its duties, against a plaintiff who subsequently filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the association is affirmed, where: 1) although the motion for fees was not timely filed, there was good cause for the delay, as it was understandable that the association was mistaken on the complex and debatable issue of whether the bankruptcy stay tolled the limitations period; and 2) although the trial court's articulated rationale for granting the fees was erroneous, its acceptance of the association's tolling argument was tantamount to a finding of good cause based on mistake.

[01/26] Munoz v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficiencia de Puerto Rico
In a retaliation case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) and Puerto Rico's general tort statute known as Article 1802, in which the jury found for the plaintiff, the district court's denial of the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial is affirmed, where: 1) the evidence presented at trial was enough to support the jury's finding of retaliation; 2) the appellants waived defenses based on the statute of limitations, the exclusive remedies bar, and a purportedly erroneous jury instruction; 3) the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the requisite fault or negligence to sustain an Article 1802 claim; and 4) the awards of damages and attorney fees were proper.

[01/26] EEOC v. Great Steaks, Inc.
On a defendant's motion for attorney's fees after it had prevailed on a Title VII claim by the EEOC alleging sexual harassment of an employee, the district court's denial of the motion is affirmed, where the district court did not abuse its discretion in: 1) finding that the EEOC's case was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, and thus denying fees under Title VII's fee-shifting provision; 2) declining to award attorney's fees under EAJA, as EAJA's mandatory fee provision did not apply, given the availability of fees under Title VII; and 3) denying the motion for attorneys' fees and costs under 28 USC section 1927.

[01/25] US v. Moore
In a prosecution of a person for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 USC section 922(g)(1), the district court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds is affirmed, but its order that the defendant repay the incurred court-appointed attorneys' fees is vacated and remanded, where: 1) the statute was constitutional as applied to the defendant; and 2) on the record before the Fourth Circuit, the district court erred by failing to make the mandatory statutory findings that funds were available to the defendant for repayment as required to order reimbursement under the Criminal Justice Act.

[01/19] Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State Grange
In a suit involving the State of Washington's "top-two" primary election system, the district court's order granting the state's request for reimbursement of attorney's fees is reversed, and its summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff's claims in other respects is affirmed, where: 1) the state showed that its primary system furthered an important regulatory interest in providing voters with relevant information about the candidates on the ballots, so as to defeat the plaintiffs' as-applied freedom of association claims; 2) the state's primary system did not violate its fundamental right of access to the ballot by making it difficult for a minor-party candidates to qualify for the general election ballot; 3) a plaintiff did not explain how the state infringed its trademark in connection with the provision of competing services; 4) a written settlement definitively resolved the state's liability for attorney's fees; 5) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint to add a new claim; 6) the plaintiffs waived a claim concerning compelled speech because it was not included in any complaint; and 7) the primary system was severable from an unconstitutional provision of the same enacting legislation.

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Evidence

[02/06] Richardson v. Branker
On a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC section 2254, the district court's judgment is: 1) reversed, insofar as it granted the petition, where the district court erred in considering the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under a de novo standard of review, and the state court did not hold unreasonably that the petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland; and 2) affirmed, insofar as it awarded summary judgment against the petitioner on his claims that the state withheld exculpatory evidence from him before trial, and that because he was mentally retarded, his sentence of death violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.

[02/03] People v. Gabriel
On appeal from conviction on charges of cultivation and possession of marijuana and other offenses, the judgment is affirmed, where: 1) the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to impeach the defendant's credibility with evidence of his prior convictions for possession of an assault weapon and cultivation of marijuana, inasmuch as each of those offenses is a crime involving moral turpitude; and 2) any error in admitting the prior convictions evidence would have been harmless error, as it would not have resulted in prejudice requiring reversal.

[02/02] Lore v. City of Syracuse
In a case alleging illegal retaliation against a city police officer under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (HRL) because of her complaints of gender discrimination, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part where the city's arguments regarding the availability of reputation damages, evidentiary and instructional errors, and excessive damages for emotional distress presented no basis for disturbing the judgment; and 2) vacated in part where there was merit in plaintiff's contentions regarding the liability of the city's corporation counsel, and the district court erred in dismissing her principal gender discrimination claims under the HRL on the basis that she had suffered no materially adverse employment action.

[02/02] People v. Brents
In a prosecution for first-degree murder and other crimes which resulted in a conviction and death sentence, the judgment is reversed as to the sentence of death, and the jury's true finding on the kidnapping special circumstance allegation is stricken, where the jury was not properly instructed regarding the need to find an independent felonious purpose to kidnap the victim, but the convictions are otherwise upheld where: 1) hearsay statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 791(b) as prior consistent statements; 2) there was no abuse of discretion in the admission of a photograph of the victim's body; 3) the trial court did not violate Penal Code section 654's prohibition against multiple sentences for a single act or course of conduct by imposing a death sentence for the murder conviction and a consecutive 25-years-to-life term for the felony assault conviction; and 4) the trial court did not make multiple errors, so that the defendant's claim of cumulative prejudice necessarily failed.

[02/02] People v. Elliott
On appeal of the death sentence after conviction for crimes including first-degree murder with the special circumstance of murder during the commission of a robbery, the sentence is affirmed against numerous and various challenges on issues relating to: 1) pretrial procedures and jury selection; 2) the defendant's guilt; 3) the penalty imposed; and 4) the adequacy of the appellate record.

[02/01] US v. Noriega-Perez
In a prosecution of a property owner stemming from his renting houses he owned near the United States-Mexico border to an alien smuggling organization knowing that they would be used as load houses to conceal and later transfer recently arrived aliens, the convictions are affirmed, where: 1) the strong circumstantial evidence presented at trial sufficed for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that non-testifying material witnesses were illegal aliens; 2) a reasonable jury could find sufficient specific evidence linking the defendant to intentionally aiding the cross-border transportation of the named material witnesses before they were dropped off in the United States.

[01/31] US v. Cain
In a prosecution of three individuals for racketeering and various related offenses, one defendant's RICO and RICO conspiracy convictions are reversed and all other convictions are affirmed where: 1) the district court’s RICO instruction was legally erroneous, and prejudicial with regard to one defendant; 2) there were several errors in the calculation of the sentencing guidelines applicable to that defendant that needed to be corrected on remand; and 3) the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to counsel of his choice when his retained attorney was disqualified by the magistrate judge overseeing pretrial proceedings.

[01/31] Welch v. California State Teachers' Retirement Board
In an administrative mandamus proceeding brought by a former school teacher challenging the defendant’s denial of her application for disability retirement benefits, the trial court's denial of the writ petition is reversed and the case remanded, where: 1) misinformation received by the plaintiff from the defendant deprived her of a reasonable opportunity to develop contemporaneous evidence of her disability; 2) the defendant had the power under Education Code section 22308 to relieve the plaintiff from the consequences of her lack of proof because that lack of proof was attributable to the misinformation the defendant provided her.

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Injury & Tort Law

[02/03] Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Roberts
In a suit brought by an insurer seeking a declaratory judgment that it was required to indemnify its insured for no more than 40 percent of a state court judgment because it had covered its insured for no more than 40 percent of the time in which the state court plaintiff was exposed to lead poisoning, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part, where it was correct in allocating the insurer's liability using the pro-rata time on-the-risk, and its decision to use the plaintiff's date of birth as the starting point for the period in which she was exposed to lead poisoning was sound; and 2) reversed in part, where the district court erred in holding the insurer liable for 24 months of coverage rather than 22, since under the insurance contract, coverage ended when the property was sold.

[02/02] Lore v. City of Syracuse
In a case alleging illegal retaliation against a city police officer under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (HRL) because of her complaints of gender discrimination, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part where the city's arguments regarding the availability of reputation damages, evidentiary and instructional errors, and excessive damages for emotional distress presented no basis for disturbing the judgment; and 2) vacated in part where there was merit in plaintiff's contentions regarding the liability of the city's corporation counsel, and the district court erred in dismissing her principal gender discrimination claims under the HRL on the basis that she had suffered no materially adverse employment action.

[02/01] Maxton v. Western States Metals
In a suit alleging negligence and strict liability causes of action based on personal injuries as a result of working with metal products manufactured by the defendants and supplied to the plaintiff's employer, the district court's judgment in favor of the defendants on demurrers is affirmed, where: 1) the metal products involved were not inherently dangerous, and no other circumstances justified imposing liability on the defendants for the plaintiff's injuries under the component parts doctrine; 2) the plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing there was a reasonable possibility that the deficiencies in the complaint could be cured by amendment.

[01/30] Sennett v. US
In a suit by a photojournalist seeking money damages against the federal government for FBI agents' alleged violations of the Privacy Protection Act (PPA) stemming from a search of her apartment, the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the United States is affirmed, where: 1) the facts as alleged showed that the officers had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was involved in criminal activity; and 2) the search of her home related to the investigation of that activity, so that the "suspect exception" to the PPA applied.

[01/27] AE v. County of Tulare
In a suit arising from the sexual assault of a minor by his foster brother, alleging against the county that ran the foster home a claim under 42 USC section 1983 for deliberate indifference and claims for negligence pursuant to California statutes, the district court's dismissal of all claims against the county is reversed, where: 1) the district court abused its discretion when it denied leave to amend the complaint to cure defects in the section 1983 claim; 2) the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the derivative liability claims against the county with prejudice and without leave to amend when it granted leave to amend as to the allegations regarding defendant county social workers.

[01/27] C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P.
In a personal injury suit in which a lessor of helium-filled tanks used to inflate festive balloons cross-complained against the lessee to enforce an indemnification provision on the back of an unsigned invoice, the trial court's judgment in favor of the lessor and award of attorney fees to it is reversed, where: 1) the lessee did not manifest assent to the terms on the back of the unsigned invoice by course of dealing or course of performance, or under basic contract law; 2) the lessee did not sign the invoice or otherwise expressly agree to its terms; 3) an unsigned invoice itself is not a contract, and repeated delivery of a particular form does not make the form part of the parties' agreement; 4) payment of the invoice merely constituted the lessee's performance of the obligation under the oral contract to pay for the rental of the helium-filled tanks; and 5) assuming the transaction was a sale of goods covered by division 2 of the California Commercial Code, the indemnification provision was not an additional term of the contract under section 2207 of the Commercial Code.

[01/26] Munoz v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficiencia de Puerto Rico
In a retaliation case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) and Puerto Rico's general tort statute known as Article 1802, in which the jury found for the plaintiff, the district court's denial of the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial is affirmed, where: 1) the evidence presented at trial was enough to support the jury's finding of retaliation; 2) the appellants waived defenses based on the statute of limitations, the exclusive remedies bar, and a purportedly erroneous jury instruction; 3) the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the requisite fault or negligence to sustain an Article 1802 claim; and 4) the awards of damages and attorney fees were proper.

[01/26] Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Squires
In an action by an insurance company seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to pay uninsured motorist benefits to a policyholder, the district court's order granting the insurer's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing counterclaims is reversed, where in light of the insurer's concession for purposes of its motion that the accident giving rise to the claim was caused by a box dropped from an unidentified vehicle, the accident arose out of the maintenance, ownership, or use of an uninsured vehicle, so that it was covered under the insurance policy.

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Insurance Law

[02/03] Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Roberts
In a suit brought by an insurer seeking a declaratory judgment that it was required to indemnify its insured for no more than 40 percent of a state court judgment because it had covered its insured for no more than 40 percent of the time in which the state court plaintiff was exposed to lead poisoning, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part, where it was correct in allocating the insurer's liability using the pro-rata time on-the-risk, and its decision to use the plaintiff's date of birth as the starting point for the period in which she was exposed to lead poisoning was sound; and 2) reversed in part, where the district court erred in holding the insurer liable for 24 months of coverage rather than 22, since under the insurance contract, coverage ended when the property was sold.

[02/03] Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Saint Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.
The district court's grant of a petition to vacate an arbitral award is reversed, and on remand the district court is instructed to grant a cross-petition to confirm the award, where there was insufficient evidence before the district court on which to base a finding of "evident partiality" within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act despite the failure of two arbitrators to disclose their concurrent service as arbitrators in another, arguably similar, arbitration.

[01/30] M & F Fishing, Inc. v. Sea-Pac Insurance Managers, Inc.
In an action by owners and operators of commercial fishing companies alleging violations of the Unfair Competition Law predicated on violations of the Insurance Code, the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs is reversed and the matter is remanded, where: 1) the plaintiffs were not entitled to restitution for insurance lawfully placed from admitted carriers; 2) the plaintiffs were not entitled to restitution of premiums paid for nonadmitted coverage; 3) the plaintiffs were barred from recovering restitution of any broker fees based on a violation of Insurance Code section 1764.1 occurring more than four years before they filed suit; 4) the trial court should have granted one defendant's motion for nonsuit for lack of an agency relationship; 5) the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied the plaintiffs' motions to amend to add additional parties; and 6) the plaintiffs' entitlement to prejudgment interest was subject to the discretion of the trial court.

[01/27] Hutcherson v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System Administration
In a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that Arizona's Medicaid agency had no right at all to recover from an annuity purchased by a husband so that his institutionalized wife could obtain Medicaid coverage or, alternatively, had no right to recover for any costs incurred for the wife's care after the husband's death, the district court's grant of the defendant's motion for summary judgment is affirmed, where: 1) the federal Medicaid Act allows states to reach a deceased community spouse's annuity for costs incurred on behalf of an institutionalized spouse; and 2) nothing in the language of the Act was inconsistent with permitting the state agency to recover from the annuity expenses incurred after the husband's death.

[01/26] Lopez & Medina Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc.
On appeal of a rejected cross-motion for summary judgment that argued that an insurance policy's coverage expressly applied to an airline's underlying claims for damages arising from the insured's failure to provide air transportation, as contractually required, to the airline's passengers, the district court's order denying the motion is affirmed, as the phrase "legally obligated to pay as damages" in a commercial general liability policy, which usually covers only tort claims, does not also provide coverage for claims in an underlying action arising out of and related to a contract between the parties.

[01/26] Fortin v. Titcomb
In a case in which a federal jury awarded the appellant $125,000 in damages against a police officer after finding that the officer negligently used force in arresting the appellant, which award the district court reduced to $10,000, the maximum set by the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA) for the personal liability of government employees, the following questions are certified to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court: 1) where an insurance policy is available to cover a judgment against a government employee sued in his or her personal capacity, is the limit on the award of damages $10,000 as set by the MTCA at section 8104-D or is the limit set by reference to sections 8105(1) and 8116?; and 2) which interpretive principles should be applied to construe an insurance policy, procured by a governmental body to cover itself or its employees for MTCA damages liability, that contains an ambiguity affecting the scope of coverage?

[01/26] Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Squires
In an action by an insurance company seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to pay uninsured motorist benefits to a policyholder, the district court's order granting the insurer's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing counterclaims is reversed, where in light of the insurer's concession for purposes of its motion that the accident giving rise to the claim was caused by a box dropped from an unidentified vehicle, the accident arose out of the maintenance, ownership, or use of an uninsured vehicle, so that it was covered under the insurance policy.

[01/25] Pearson v. Superior Court (Nicholson)
In a suit by a minor through his guardian ad litem to recover damages for personal injuries, which was settled by the defendants' insurance carrier but not approved by the court because the minor died before the court could rule on the petition for approval, the guardian ad litem's petition for writ of mandate to compel the superior court to grant a motion for approval of the settlement and for its enforcement is granted, as: 1) an agreement compromising the claims of a minor, while the petition for its approval is pending, is voidable only at the election of the minor or his or her guardian; and 2) a defendant or its carrier has no right to object to the petition.

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